During the colonial period in Nigeria (from about 1850 to 1960), the British, like any other colonial power, asserted their dominance through a variety of media.  The colonial experience of Nigeria and Britain, and Nigeria's early post-colonial history can be described, roughly chronologically, in three phases or periods:  the formation of a ‘captured' colony, the education and inculcation of ‘proper,' British ways (i.e., the ‘taming' of the colony), and the immediate aftermath of colonialism (i.e., the ‘independence' of the colony).  This essay attempts to scrutinize these periods in the light of the theories of Karl Marx, Ernest Gellner, and Jack Snyder.  My claim is that Nigeria's colonial relationship with Britain, in general, reflects Marx's theory of the dichotomy between the oppressor and the oppressed, Gellner's theory that domination and oppression is disseminated through educational means, and Snyder's theory on the risks and dangers that young, ‘immature' … countries face when they gamble on democracy … 

The formation of a ‘captured' colony

How does one capture a colony?  The simple answer is “Look at Nigeria.”  The ‘capture' of Nigeria by the militaristic British was one of the early distinct indications of its colonialism; thus, it attracted mixed responses.  As described by Elizabeth Isichei, an acclaimed Nigerian socio-political critic, many Nigerians were deemed ‘collaborators' for helping the British, the public was seen as defiant, but passive, and others were believed to have been ‘rebels' (Chapter 14).

            To adapt one of Isichei's claims, Nigeria's “confrontation with an alien culture, its conquest, and the experience of an alien rule, created … [crises]” (180).  There were many riots and conflicts between the Nigerians and the British, although most of the uprisings were eventually subdued by the military power of the British.  Riots were common—from the culturally rooted Yoruba riots in the West and the religious skirmishes with the Muslims and Hausa in the North, to the confrontations with the naturally ‘rich,' yet stubborn Igbo and Delta states.  Apart from encompassing all the major ethnic groupings and regions in Nigeria, amazingly these conflicts also covered the three most explicit British inculcations:  cultural, religious, and economic.  Such profound ‘daylight robbery' could be not be left … unanswered …

            The British practice of ‘indirect' rule caused great commotion, especially among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria.  As part of this kind of rule, the British placed certain Yoruba individuals as the leaders of other Yorubas.  This was a change to the existing cultural and hierarchical structure because, under this system, many villagers were governed by members from other villages with whom they had been traditionally or historically at odds.  As a result, when the British ‘direct officers' tried to make cultural changes in the Yoruba community, the public often resisted the words of these pseudo-leaders, which, in turn, caused them to be replaced by British officers.  The repetition f this process eventually caused immense frustration within the Yoruba people because their views were not properly represented, their complaints often fell on deaf ears, and they were under the direct rule of their ancestral enemies.  Consequently, several Yorubas opposed this system of rule and reacted violently towards their ‘indirect' and colonial leaders.

            The British military expansion into Northern Nigeria introduced Christianity to a region which had experienced over five hundred years of Islam; hence, there were religion-based skirmishes between the Muslims and the [invading] British Christians.  As Professor Aliyu Babatunde Fafunwa, a former Minister of Education in Nigeria, explains, “It was not surprising, therefore, that the advent of Christianity in Nigeria …caused a head-on collision with Islam” (100).  To aid this conquest, the British in 1903, under the leadership of Lord Lugard, launched an 800-mile military campaign, described as ‘pacifications of the North' to bring the Northern emirates by force of arms under the authority of the British government and Christian movement (Fafunwa 101).  The result … was the formation of a number of Muslim radical movements, such as the ‘Mahdists,' whose goal was to ‘cleanse' the land of the British.

            The southeastern quarter of Nigeria, mostly inhabited by the Igbo people, was economically very important to the British because of its natural resources; thus, most of England's commercial exploitation of Nigeria occurred in this area.  Apart from suffering the daily oil spillages caused by British oil driller, the communities also frequently suffered imposed taxations on products and services.  For instance, in 1929, when the British conveniently set up a warrant chief system to impose a … tax on the people of Aba, there was immense rioting, especially by the women.  The women were unhappy about the over-taxation of their husbands and sons, which, they felt, was pauperizing them and causing economic hardship for the entire community.  In reaction, they rose up in a mass protest against the oppressive rule of the colonial government.  As part of their protest, some 25,000 Igbo women covered about 6,000 square miles in their march, burning and looting British trading posts and services in their path.  They eventually forced the resignation of these warrant chiefs and made the British lower the taxes.

            Regardless of the results of the riots, these illustrations reflect the Marxist theory of struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor (Marx and Engels 473).  A common theme in all these instances of revolt was the resistance of the oppressed (the Nigerians) to their oppressors (the British), who controlled and dictated their cultural, religious, and economic lives by “Bible, Business, and Bullet” (Fafunwa 74).  British colonial practice in Nigeria highlights one of Marx's theories and eventually succeeds in ‘capturing' the country.

The ‘taming' of the colony

            The British, during colonial times, used education as a tool to further dominate and oppress Nigerians, a tool to cultivate a ‘proper' style of thinking.  The inculcation of this style of thinking came in the guise of Christianity:

            The British officials who were themselves Christians were representing, as Lord Lugard himself claimed, ‘the most Christian nation' in the world.  British occupation in Nigeria was therefore synonymous with Christian evangelism, and the concept of ‘civilising'—helping the benighted Africans to accept Christianity and Western civilisation—became the order of the day (Fafunwa 71)

Therefore, the first form of Western education in Nigeria was lead by the missionaries, and they, without exception, used the schools as a means of converting the indigenous people to Christianity.  During this time, the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) and the Methodist Missionary Society were the first British Christian organizations to set up schools in Nigeria.  Most of their work was conducted in the southern half of Nigeria, where it was deemed ‘safer.'  Some of their achievements included the translation of the Bible into the local languages such as Yoruba, Ibo, Efik and Nupe, the introduction of vocational or industrial education, the use of English as the vernacular, and the establishment of a ‘proper' code of conduct for the localities.  Most of the schools set up by these missions were boarding schools, for they believed that “if children were to develop along civilised lines, their daily life must be supervised, controlled and directed along ‘proper lines'.  That is, if a ‘raw' African is to be made a civilised, Christian black European, he must be isolated from the evil influences of his pagan past and present”  (Fafunwa 99).

            Some of the British commandants intentionally chose certain aspects of Christianity that were taught in the schools.  For instance, S.I.M. missionaries were Canadians and Lugard, the British leader in Nigeria, supported their industrial aim but strongly objected to their type of religious, Christian preaching:  “'I am informed that they preach the equality of European and antives, which, however true from a doctrinal point of view, is apt to be mis-applied by people in a low stage of development, and interpreted as abolition of class [and race] distinction'” (Fafunwa 102-3).  Therefore, the British chose what portions of their Christianity that they thought ought to be represented in their educational style in order to further subject ‘people in a low stage of development' (i.e., Nigerians) to their command.  Between 1850 and 1960, the activities, discipline and style of teaching that existed in these schools reflected the properties that the British ‘educators' believed a good Nigerian citizen ought to have:  “A ‘good' citizen in Nigeria … meant one who was African by blood, Christian by religion and British or French in culture and intellect” (Fafunwa 71).

            As seen here, the British used education as a tool to cultivate religious and cultural hegemony in Nigerians.  The colonialists oppressed the inhabitants by subjecting them to … foreign values.  This form of oppression explicitly illustrates Ernest Gellner's theory that education is a means of subjugating people to a cultural hegemony; such subjugation then leads to the domination of a people:  “Gellner's theory is constituted by the argument that the existence of a uniform educational system exists which is the primary state agent employed as progenitor of… cultural homogeneity”  (Gutierrez 165).  In this case, the progenitor was the Christian education (of course, without those controversial portions of the religion that might undermine British power), and the [result] was the inculcation of British principles and morals.

The ‘independence' of the colony

            Contrary to the meaning of the word, in the early years of  Nigeria's ‘independence,' the country was actually still dependent on the British.  British colonialism made Nigeria, joining diverse peoples and regions in an artificial political entity; the British, it is said, created a country called Nigeria, not a nation.  The creation of this collage of people involved socio-economic and political troubles that the country once again relied on British advice and policies to help solve.  Raph Uwechue, a leading journalist and editor-in-chief of Africa Magazine illustrates in his book Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War that, in 1960, when Nigeria became an independent state, Nigerians temporarily had to accept the Queen of England as the Head of State (5).  For many years after her independence, Nigeria still had her policies influenced by England, and, to some extent, still feels her dominating presence as embodied in her membership in the British Commonwealth.

            One of the problems that emerged from this collection of people—and one which is also present in most other democratically developing countries—was “far too many people [were] struggling for a share of too small a national cake” (Uwechue 157).  Thus it was not surprising that nationalism became a political factor in Nigeria, a nationalism whose goal was to have increased political participation and representation of the different backgrounds embedded in her citizens, and a fight for which subgroup's identity should be adopted as the ‘national identity.'

            By 1967, the Igbo people was the ethnic group in the collage fighting for equal socio-political participation, representation, and treatment.  For this reason, on May 30, 1967, the Igbos, under the leadership of Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, decided to secede from the rest of Nigeria and form Biafra.  The reason for this secession can be traced to the previous year.  In January of 1966, a coup led by General Aguyi Ironsi, an Igbo man, toppled the government of Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, a northerner, killing a recorded total of 15 people.  This revolution brought hope for socio-political equality to the oppressed Igbos.  But this celebration was short-lived as “General Ironsi quickly proved equally unable to manage the political situation produced by the coup” (Uwechue 35).  The failure of Ironsi's leadership lead to the counter-coup of July 1966, which was headed by Northerner Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon.  The results of this counter-coup totally crushed the initial hopes of the Igbos as their oppression and exclusion continued.  Furthermore, the success of this counter-coup, which was accurately labeled the ‘Northern revenge,' cost the lives of 214 people, mostly Igbos.

            Four of the reasons cited by Biafran officials as the reason for their secession include:

 

(1)   The pogrom of 1966 which took place in Northern Nigeria, and the persecution and terrorizing of Eastern Nigerians …in other parts of Nigeria, and which drove all living Eastern Nigerians … back to Eastern Nigeria ... 

(2)   Then came a series of economic acts calculated to aggravate the unfortunate plight of Eastern Nigerians.  Notable examples are the food blockage in October 1966 and the subsequent economic blockade of Eastern Nigeria by air, land, and sea ... 

(3)   These were followed by the application of political sanctions... [including] the withdrawal of Nigerian passports from persons of Eastern Nigerian origin …

(4)   Postal, telegraphic and transport services between the rest of Nigeria and Eastern Nigeria were stopped by Lt. Col. Gowon.

 

Biafrans argue that this sequence of maltreatments necessitated secession in order to preserve the Igbos and their right to equal socio-political treatment.  The specifics of the reason for the Igbo secession and the series of coup d'etats might be arguable, but what is not is that, as young, democratically immature country, Nigeria was in tumult due to nationalistic ideals, and for about three years was split into two countries—herself and Biafra.

            This string of events in Nigeria's post-colonial history is an illustration of Jack Snyder's theory that young, immature democracies tend to be impeded and conflict-ridden due to ethnic tensions [often] triggered by nationalist ideas (25-27).  According to Snyder, diverse evidence points to a connection between democratization and conflicts fueled by nationalism.  In Nigeria's case, 1960 brought about her independence from Britain, and she started practicing democracy, but, by 1966, just six years later, explicit ethnic conflicts had begun to ruin her people.  Snyder further describes the relationship that exists between the democratization process and these conflicts as like a bell-curve.  When a country is in its early stages of democracy, the ethnic tensions escalate (as seen in the experience of the Igbos and the Federal Government of Nigeria), and, if the country can survive until the later stages, these conflicts subside.  But, if the country cannot survive, it … gives way to nationalism.  The failure in the early years of Nigeria's democracy to survive its ethnic conflicts [meant] endless coup d'etats that further oppressed the people.  In February of 2000, Nigeria elected President Olusegun Obasanjo—the first democratically elected president in more than two decades.  Therefore, one may safely conclude that, according to Snyder's theory, Nigeria is getting a second chance at democracy.

            In conclusion, all these illustrations from the different periods in Nigeria's history (the ‘capturing' of the colony, the ‘taming' of the colony, and the ‘independence' of the colony) are reflective of social theories by Marx, Gellner, and Snyder.  Resistance to British colonialism by the Western, Northern, and Eastern states, although mostly unsuccessful, reflects Marx's theory of the struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed.  The enforcement of British education (i.e., the ‘proper' way of thinking) on Nigerians explicitly illustrates Gellner's theory of domination through education.  Finally, Nigeria's ethnic tensions and civil war, which were triggered by nationalistic ideals that later resulted in [the secession of] Biafra, are illustrations of Snyder's theory of the ‘gamble' for democracy and its initial consequences.

            Furthermore, I argue that Nigeria's experiences and phases are typical of the history of other colonies—especially African colonies.  Ghana, another British West-African colony, also experienced a pre- and post-colonial history similar to Nigeria's.  After an intensive struggle with the British, headed by Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana won her independence from the British in 1957 and decided to embrace democracy.  Her post-colonial history, which is filled with coup d'etats, one after another, was mostly triggered by ethnic conflicts for socio-political and economic equality.

            Nigeria has come a long way in her pre- and post-colonial conflicts and experiences.  These experiences helped shape what the country is today and what decisions or mistakes [she should try] to avoid in the future.   [Such] corrections, it is hoped, would eventually mean a more democratic setting … wherein every Nigerian has an equal opportunity to reach for his or her dreams.

 

Works Cited

Fafunwa, A. Babs.  History of Education in Nigeria.  London:  George, Allen, & Unwin, 1974.

Gutierrez, Natividad.  Ethnic Revivals within Nation-States?  The Theories of E. Gellner and A.D. Smith Revisited.  (handout)

Isichei, Elizabeth.  The Ibo People and the Europeans.  New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1973.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels.  Manifesto of the Communist Party.  1883. (handout)

Snyder, Jack.  From Voting to Violence. (handout)

Uwechue, Raph.  Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War.  New York:  Africana Publishing, 1971.