Michael J. Benevento, Jr.

Lyndon Johnson
and the Charade of
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution

The official rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson’s administration
portrayed the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an unprovoked and malicious
attack on U.S. ships by the armed forces of North Vietnam, as a
result of which the President needed the power to deal militarily
with the North Vietnamese. The Gulf of Tonkin incident explicitly
encompasses military actions on August 2, and alleged actions on
August 4, 1964, between North Vietnamese torpedo patrol boats and
United States destroyers and aircraft off the coast of North Vietnam.
President Johnson and many top administration officials declared that
the United States was innocent of any aggressive offensive maneuvers
against the North Vietnamese, and that the attack on two U.S. destroyers
was an unexpected slap in the face. In reality, however, the opposite
of the administration’s claims was true. Through a period of years,
and especially throughout the nine months prior to the incident in the
Gulf of Tonkin, there was thick and constant U.S. involvement with
the South Vietnamese, who conducted many joint offensive operations
against North Vietnam.

This paper will show just how intensely the United States was
involved in covert military action against North Vietnam in the ninemonth
period (Lyndon Johnson’s first nine months as President) leading
up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Further, it will demonstrate that
the second alleged attack (August 4) by the North Vietnamese in the
Gulf of Tonkin never occurred, but was fictionalized by the Johnson
administration in order to ask Congress to give the President the
authority to conduct overt military operations against North Vietnam.
The idea for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution had been in existence at least
two months prior to the incident, while the Johnson administration
perpetuated the lie that the Resolution was written in response to North
Vietnamese aggression. In addition, this paper will argue that the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution itself and the rhetoric of President Johnson
and his advisers show that the top officials in the U.S. government had
an attitude of insincerity toward South Vietnam as an independent
country. The stepping-up of military efforts by the U.S. in the first nine
months of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency was motivated by a self-serving
sentiment, which was to show the world the United States’ political
resolve with regard to the spread of Communism.

In essence, the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
enabled President Johnson to use whatever means necessary to do what
he wanted to do, or felt he needed to do, in Southeast Asia. Immediately
after what has become known as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the
President asked Congress for the power to use overt military force in
Vietnam without the declaration of war. At the time, however, it was
extremely unclear exactly what had taken place in the Gulf and whether
or not the Resolution asked for was legitimate and just.

The revelation that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a
charade is presented by many ... [Even] George Ball, who was the
Undersecretary of State under Johnson, spoke to Hendrickson about
the “Gulf of Tonkin charade.”2 The Undersecretary of State’s calling
the Gulf of Tonkin incident a “charade” is very strong wording, as he
was one of the President’s close advisors. However, it is important to
note that George Ball, at the time of the incident, was the only dove
in the President’s inner circle. This fact could possibly have prompted
him to deride the Resolution as more unjustified than it was, as all of
Johnson’s close advisors were arguing against Ball with regard to U.S.
involvement in Vietnam. Nevertheless, as will be further demonstrated,
Ball was absolutely correct to classify the incident and the Resolution as
a “charade.”3

Stanley Karnow mentions the Gulf of Tonkin incident and
Resolution as an example of how the United States, in 1964, was
disconnected from what was going on in Vietnam. He makes the point
that because Congress nearly unanimously passed the
Resolution (only two opposing votes), which sprang from an
incomprehensibly confused incident, that the U.S. was not aware of
what was really going on in Southeast Asia.4 Moreover, the air strikes
with which the Johnson administration retaliated for the Gulf of Tonkin
events, “in reality…reflected the plans the administration had already
drawn up for gradually increasing its overt military pressure against the
North.”5 For example, as early as January 1964, Johnson had approved
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34-A, which expressly stated that “by the use
of ‘progressively escalating pressure’…[the plan] would seek ‘to inflict
increasing punishment upon north Vietnam…’”6

The actions of the United States prior to the Gulf of Tonkin
incident show that the U.S. had been conducting clandestine combat and
sabotage missions in coordination with the South Vietnamese against
North Vietnam. Thus the Johnson administration’s account of the
event as an unwarranted aggressive strike against U.S. ships, which were
themselves doing nothing offensive, is not true. The level of secrecy
and the long length of time preceding the Gulf of Tonkin in which the
U.S. had directed military action against the North show that the Gulf
of Tonkin incident was in fact a pretence for the Johnson administration
to proceed overtly in its military actions against North Vietnam. Three
years before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in 1961, “secret intelligence
gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central
Intelligence Agency.”7 In addition to the lengthy time period of covert
operations leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin, the deliberate attempt
by the U.S. to fool all involved is evidenced by the fact that “Nastyclass
fast patrol boats were purchased [with U.S. money for the South
Vietnamese] quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United
States was not involved in the operations.”8

Increased aggressiveness … on the part of the United States
can be seen from the time President Johnson took the oath of office on
November 22, 1963. In a meeting with cabinet members two days later,
CIA Director John McCone “received … the first ‘President Johnson
tone’ for action as contrasted with the ‘Kennedy tone.’” In notes which
McCone made to himself in 1963, he wrote, “Johnson definitely feels
that we place too much emphasis on social reforms [in South Vietnam];
he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being
‘dogooders’…”9

One of the most compelling arguments for the claim that
the incident was a charade, which was used merely as a means to
give Johnson the power to escalate military action in Vietnam, is that
the Resolution was in existence before the incident. As a matter of
fact, a string of documents, which existed long before the Gulf of
Tonkin incident, can attest to the fact that it was the United States
who was actively and aggressively planning and carrying out military
actions against the North. On November 26, 1963, just four days
after he became President, Johnson approved National Security Action
Memorandum 273. It declared: “It remains the central object of the
United States in Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that
country to win their contest against the externally directed and
supported Communist conspiracy.10

Subsequently, in late January 1964, in reaction to the Khanh
coup, which established General Nguyen Khanh as Premier of South
Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the President to take “bolder
actions which may embody greater risks.” The Joint Chiefs proposed
adding U.S. military forces to South Vietnam if needed, the mining of
harbors in the North, and even conducting attacks by ground forces
against Communist supply lines in Laos. In addition, they suggested
that the United States take over control of all military operations. Walt
Rostow, who was the Director of the Policy Planning Council of the
State Department, concurred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.11 Other
prominent members of Johnson’s cabinet also agreed. Dean Rusk,
“the President’s principle foreign affairs advisor,” Robert McNamara,
the Secretary of Defense, and McGeorge Bundy, who was the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, were all in
accord with the idea of increasing the “costs” to the North Vietnamese;
these men wanted to counter the Communist infiltration into South
Vietnam by propping up the regime … by the use of U.S. military
action.12

One month later, in February of 1964 (six months before
the Tonkin Gulf incident), National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM) 280 called for a “small committee for the management of
U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam.”13 In addition to setting
aside personnel for this “small committee,” which was to be headed
by William Sullivan, NSAM 280 gave this group authorization for
unhindered action with direction from the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk. This document declared that the “committee shall move
energetically, and that department appeal from Mr. Sullivan’s decisions
shall be kept at a minimum.” Significantly, NSAM 280, which existed six
months before the incident that U.S. policymakers called an unprovoked
attack, explicitly stated that the U.S. was involved in a war: “…the
establishment of this committee will permit an energetic, unified and
skillful prosecution of the only war we face at present.”14

Consequently, on February 18, 1964, Johnson ordered the
planning of “additional actions in Vietnam” and that they be “stepped
up.”15 The committee that NSAM 280 established was to study the
situation in Vietnam with respect to conducting operations that
would combat Communist insurgency into the South. The analysis
the committee drew up was based on the “concept that the North
Vietnamese would be concerned about destruction of their industrial
achievements, as well as about whether possible Chinese help [for the
North] could lead to Chinese control.” The NSAM 280 committee
expressed “five objectives of ‘measured pressure’ against North
Vietnam.” They were:

These objectives show that there was a serious amount of time and
analysis devoted to planning military operations against North Vietnam
well before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. These objectives also show
that the United States’ motive for intervention in Vietnam was a
self-serving motivation—“to show the world that we will take strong
measures….”17 ...

In NSAM 288 there is a sentiment of disingenuousness
toward Vietnam as an independent country. It states that “the South
Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a
nation to meet the Communist ‘war of liberation.’ Thus, purely in
terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high…”18 … Thus the U.S. was
perpetuating its own involvement in Vietnam for apparently self-serving
reasons—to show that America was strong and could not be bullied
by the threat of a global Communist conspiracy. For, whether the
Communist threat was real or imagined, the U.S. was there for purposes
of self-interest. Evidence that shows Johnson using the situation in
Vietnam for the United States’ and his own purposes is also found in a
conversation between Presidential Special Assistant Bill D. Moyers and
President Johnson after the meeting held with advisers only two days
after Johnson became president. While conversing about Henry Cabot
Lodge’s report on the frailty of the South Vietnamese government,
Moyers asked about the significance of the U.S. not doing something
about it. The President replied, “…they’ll think with Kennedy dead
we’ve lost heart. So they’ll think we’re yellow and don’t mean what
we say.” When Moyers asked who “they” were, Johnson said, “The
Chinese. The fellas in the Kremlin. They’ll be taking the measure of
us. They’ll be wondering just how far they can go.”19 This conversation
shows that Johnson was willing to intervene in Vietnam with the
purpose of maintaining an ideological stature for the world to see. What
Johnson said in this conversation does not convey a genuine feeling
of trying to help the South Vietnamese as the official administration’s
rhetoric proclaimed; instead, Johnson’s words show that he was more
concerned with what other countries thought of the United States.

Notes

1 Paul Hendrickson, The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and Five
Lives of a Lost War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 123.
2 Hendrickson, Living and the Dead, 148. Emphasis mine.
3 Hendrickson, Living and the Dead, 148.
4 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997),
5 Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, 30-Year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie
Launched Vietnam War, “Media Beat, July 27, 1994,” <http://www.fair.
org/media-beat/940727.html> (5 December 2002).
6 William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War:
Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships-Part III: January-July 1965
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 4.
7 Dale Andrade and Kenneth Conboy, The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf
Incident, “Naval History, August 1999,” Annapolis MD: U.S. Naval
Institute, 2002, <http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/
NHandrade.htm> (5 December 2002).
8 The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident.
9 Gibbons, U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 2.
10 Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid., 5, 6.
12 Ibid., 5.
13 National Security Action Memorandum No. 280, Lyndon Baines Johnson
Library and Museum-National Archives and Records Administration,
<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/
nsam280.asp> (5 December 2002).
14 Ibid.
15 Gibbons, U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 6.
16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid., 6. Emphasis mine.
18 George C. Herring, The Pentagon Papers-Abridged Edition (New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), 94.
19 Gibbons, U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 2.