Some Reflections on Access Equity - Some Limitations of Linguistic Reform - The Research Center on Computing & Society

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Charles E. M. Dunlop

Some Limitations of Linguistic Reform

How, then, is the required adjustment to be accomplished? One way is through legal remedy. Various pieces of legislation, such as those mentioned by Dr. Maner, are important steps. Maner also recommends what he calls “moral semantics” as a vehicle for combating prejudice. As he put it, “If we stop to put our vocabulary in good order our behavior may begin to follow suit.” Specifically, he distinguishes between a “disability,” or objectively specifiable medical condition, and a “handicap” which is an obstacle relative to the pursuit of some social goal.

Insofar as this is a proposal to register our social sensibilities in word as well as deed, I applaud the suggestion. It may also help us in articulating a clear goal of social policy; namely, the removal of handicapping conditions. Having acknowledged these positive aspects of Maner’s proposal, however, I would like also to register several caveats.

First, there is the danger of substituting language for action. Maner hopes that behavioral changes may follow linguistic changes. But an alternative possibility is that we will simply change our manner of speaking and stop with that, deceiving ourselves with “correct” language that fails to be reflected in our deeds. If that happens, we will have created a dangerous illusion of progress where none has occurred.

Second, there is the question whether linguistic reform has the sort of power that Maner hopes for it. The linguist, Robin Lakoff, is dubious about that point. She argues that the introduction of new terminology will do little to address problems of prejudice, because the real cause lies much deeper, woven into a social fabric [6: 29 – 30]. At the same time, given the right social climate, there may be a complementary interplay between deliberate linguistic reform and social change. Although Lakoff makes this point in the context of race relations, I think its application to our topic will be clear enough:

Although blacks are not yet fully accorded equal status with whites in this society, nevertheless black, a term coined to elicit racial pride and sense of unity, seems to have been widely adopted both by blacks and whites, both in formal use and in the media, and increasingly in colloquial conversation. Does this constitute a counter example to my claim here? I think not, but rather an element of hope. My point is that linguistic and social change go hand in hand: One cannot, purely by changing language use, change social status. The word black, in its current sense, was not heard until the late 1960s or even 1970, to any significant extent. I think if its use had been proposed much earlier, it would have failed in acceptance. I think the reason people other than blacks can understand and sympathize with black racial pride is that they were made aware of the depths of their prejudice during the civil rights struggles of the early 1960s. It took nearly ten years from the beginning of this struggle for the use of black to achieve wide acceptance, and it is still often used a bit self-consciously, as though italicized. But since great headway was made first in the social sphere, linguistic progress could be made on that basis; and now this linguistic progress, it is hoped, will lead to new social progress in turn. . . . social change must precede lexical change. [6: 41 – 42]

My final caveat involves the danger of what I’ll dub “Linguistic Correctness,” a term chosen to echo the currently debated topic of “Political Correctness” (for a survey of some recent literature, see [1: 50 – 56]). While acknowledging that attention to how we speak can help sharpen our own sensibilities, and those of others, it seems to me that an extended emphasis of this point can become counterproductive. Potential allies may come to feel uncomfortable in expressing an opinion for fear of expressing themselves in a way that is deemed “Linguistically Incorrect,” just as voices have been silenced on some university campuses because the speakers were branded “Politically Incorrect.” How might this happen? Well, Dr. Maner distinguishes between “disability” and “handicap,” and urges us to “put the person first” by using the phrase “individuals who are disabled” instead of “disabled individuals” or, worse, “the handicapped.” All of this strikes me as sensible, and I have tried to follow his recommendation here. At the same time, I have heard others object to any use of the term “disabled,” recommending “differently abled” instead. Yet, we just heard a sensitive commentator recommend the phrase “individuals who are disabled.” Where does all this stop? Surely we don’t want to carry on to the levels of linguistic absurdity that have cropped up in other quarters: e.g., a professor at Washington University holds “ovulars” rather than “seminars” [15: 36], and it has even been suggested that “himicanes” be substituted for “hurricanes,” on the grounds that the familiar term reflects badly on women [6: 46]. I do not for a moment claim that Maner’s suggestions are in this category. My concern is that a suggestion that begins innocently enough, with the goal of eradicating stereotypes, can (if unchecked) point the way to wrangling and intimidation, focusing attention away from the truly substantive issues. Meanwhile, spectators drop in, tune out, and turn off.

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