Computer Access Equity - An Offering of Bounded Concessions - The Research Center on Computing & Society

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Walter Maner

3. An Offering of Bounded Concessions

I am sobered by the serious nature of these constraints and by the acceleration of the skewed access trends I catalogued earlier. In the face of them, my initial response will be to offer some concessions.

First, I concede that there exists no basic right to computer access for all people. It is not an uncreated “natural” right, like life and liberty, which persons could claim since the dawn of civilization. Nor is it, like free public education, a de facto right established on the strength of broad social recognition. Nor is it an explicit political right created by law, or even one that has such urgency that it is likely to be created soon.

If there did exist a basic right to computer access, it would have to provide more than a simple freedom to the unrestrained use of computer resources we already access. If we are without access, we need more than forbearance from others. We need entitlements. We will want to be in a position to demand access of those who could conceivably supply or withhold it. We will want access brokers to accede to our demands whether they are inclined to do so or not. Attempts to legislate computer access rights may fail precisely because of the unacceptable burdens needed to fund such entitlements. But even if a basic right of computer access were created, it would still not be a right of equal access. If you or I were entitled to equal access, then we could demand that the level of access given to any particular person, be given also to us.

Second, I concede that there is no primary human need for computer access. Unlike food, water, shelter, and minimum health care, computers are not essential to the continuance of life itself. Of course, as society becomes more complex, it may well be that secondary needs, such as transportation and vocational education, deserve promotion to primary status. Computer access may someday deserve a similar elevation in status, but this need not concern us until computers prove to be as necessary to ordinary life as telephones. When this happens, there will remain a further problem involving the incongruence of desire and need. It seems likely that those who will most need to improve their access to computers will be least motivated to demand it. At the other extreme, those who will be most motivated to demand increased access will be least likely to need it.

Third, I concede that uniform and equal access to computers may be the wrong goal. It seems inevitable that some people will want, need and possibly deserve more computing power than can be made available to every person, across the board. Power is costly, therefore scarce, therefore cannot be distributed in usably equal shares to all people. Even if society could afford it, we would not adopt the goal of putting super-computers on every desk top. For one thing, many users would gladly trade power for simplicity.

Fourth, it is unclear what “equitable access” might entail. It probably includes access to some type of computing hardware . . . but it could entail access to the training needed to operate the hardware. It probably includes access to some type of system software . . . but it could entail access to public information utilities by means of specialized telecommunications software. It might entail access to hardware and software upgrades, if improved access were necessary to remain at parity with others in the workplace. It might include public access, or access from rural locations. It might include access to software that is language-appropriate or age-appropriate or gender-appropriate or appropriate to one’s level of cognitive function. For persons with motor or sensory restrictions, achieving equity could require access to whatever special hardware and software may be necessary for them to be as productive as anyone else. We remain vague about equity partly because we don’t know how to measure the adequacy of information access or how to define accessibility benchmarks (Heim, 1978).

Fifth, I concede that lack of computer access is not necessarily an ethical problem. Inaccessibility may result from misguided personal choices or from external circumstances that are merely unfortunate rather than unjust. Of course, it matters where one draws the line between what is unfortunate and what is unjust. If it is merely unfortunate that I lack computer access, I can still hope for remedies motivated by benevolence or compassion. But misfortune alone isn’t grounds for asking society to redistribute resources in my favor.

Finally, I concede that access issues, problems, strategies and solutions are likely to be reshaped by the evolution of computer technology. Data gloves, pen-based notebook computers, and speaker-independent voice recognition systems will create different mixes of resolved and unresolved issues. Access will become easier in some respects and more difficult in others as advantages and disadvantages are redistributed.

I now want to limit the concessions I have made by stressing several important points that I believe should not be surrendered.

Even if there exists no basic right to computer access for all people, we may still insist that morally relevant criteria operate when some persons are given access while others are denied.

Even if there exists no primary human need for computer access, we may proceed to make a strong case for a derivative need to access a basic range of practical computer services. We may define this minimum level of service and argue forcefully that this need will only grow as computer technology becomes more pervasive.

Even if a scarcity of resources makes universal equal access to computers an elusive goal, we may still argue for some form of equality in those situations where a distribution of computer resources has been made. In a computerized office, for example, we may demand that all workers have at least the minimum access to computer resources required for the timely performance of their job functions.

Finally and most important:

Although we are unclear about its positive implications, we understand the negative side of “equitable access” well enough to recognize and remedy systemic inequities. We know inequity when we see it, and that is enough to set an initial agenda for greater social justice.

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