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[This article was published in the Summer 2000 issue of
the American Philosophical Association’s Newsletter
on Philosophy and Computing]
Computer ethics as a field of study was founded by MIT professor
Norbert Wiener during World War Two (early 1940s) while helping to develop
an antiaircraft cannon capable of shooting down fast warplanes. One part
of the cannon had to “perceive” and track an airplane, then
calculate its likely trajectory and “talk” to another part of
the cannon to fire the shells. The engineering challenge of this project
caused Wiener and some colleagues to create a new branch of science, which
Wiener called “cybernetics” – the science of information
feedback systems. The concepts of cybernetics, when combined with the
digital computers being created at that time, led Wiener to draw some
remarkably insightful ethical conclusions. He perceptively foresaw revolutionary
social and ethical consequences. In 1948, for example, in his book Cybernetics:
or control and communication in the animal and the machine, he
said the following:
It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-rapid
computing machine was in principle an ideal central nervous system to
an apparatus for automatic control; and that its input and output need
not be in the form of numbers or diagrams but might very well be, respectively,
the readings of artificial sense organs, such as photoelectric cells
or thermometers, and the performance of motors or solenoids.... we are
already in a position to construct artificial machines of almost any
degree of elaborateness of performance. Long before Nagasaki and the
public awareness of the atomic bomb, it had occurred to me that we were
here in the presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of
importance for good and for evil. (pp. 27 – 28)
In 1950 Wiener published his monumental computer ethics
book, The Human Use of Human Beings, which not only established him as
the founder of computer ethics, but far more importantly, laid down a
comprehensive computer ethics foundation which remains today – half
a century later – a powerful basis for computer ethics research and
analysis. (However, he did not use the name “computer ethics”
to describe what he was doing.) His book includes (1) an account of the
purpose of a human life, (2) four principles of justice, (3) a powerful
method for doing applied ethics, (4) discussions of the fundamental questions
of computer ethics, and (5) examples of key computer ethics topics. (Wiener
1950/1954, see also Bynum 1999)
Wiener made it clear that, on his view, the integration of computer technology
into society will constitute the remaking of society – the “second
industrial revolution” – destined to affect every major aspect
of life. The computer revolution will be a multifaceted, ongoing process
that will take decades of effort and will radically change everything.
Such a vast undertaking will necessarily include a wide diversity of tasks
and challenges. Workers must adjust to radical changes in the work place;
governments must establish new laws and regulations; industry and business
must create new policies and practices; professional organizations must
develop new codes of conduct for their members; sociologists and psychologists
must study and understand new social and psychological phenomena; and
philosophers must rethink and redefine old social and ethical concepts.
Unfortunately, this complex and important new area of applied
ethics, which Wiener founded in the 1940s, remained nearly undeveloped
and unexplored until the mid 1960s. By then, important social and ethical
consequences of computer technology had already become manifest, and interest
in computer-related ethical issues began to grow. Computer-aided bank
robberies and other crimes attracted the attention of Donn Parker, who
wrote books and articles on computer crime and proposed to the Association
for Computing Machinery that they adopt a code of ethics for their members.
The ACM appointed Parker to head a committee to create such a code, which
was adopted by that professional organization in 1973. (The ACM Code was
revised in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s.)
Also in the mid 1960s, computer-enabled invasions
of privacy by “big-brother” government agencies became a public
worry and led to books, articles, government studies, and proposed privacy
legislation. By the mid 1970s, new privacy laws and computer crime laws
had been enacted in America and in Europe, and organizations of computer
professionals were adopting codes of conduct for their members. At the
same time, MIT computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum created a computer
program called ELIZA, intended to crudely simulate “a Rogerian psychotherapist
engaged in an initial interview with a patient.” Weizenbaum was appalled
by the reaction that people had to his simple computer program. Some psychiatrists,
for example, viewed his results as evidence that computers will soon provide
automated psychotherapy; and certain students and staff at MIT even became
emotionally involved with the computer and shared their intimate thoughts
with it! Concerned by the ethical implications of such a response, Weizenbaum
wrote the book Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), which is now considered
a classic in computer ethics.
In 1976, while teaching a medical ethics course, Walter
Maner noticed that, often, when computers are involved in medical ethics
cases, new ethically important considerations arise. Further examination
of this phenomenon convinced Maner that there is need for a separate branch
of applied ethics, which he dubbed “computer ethics.” (Wiener
had not used this term, nor was it in common use before Maner.) Maner
defined computer ethics as that branch of applied ethics which studies
ethical problems “aggravated, transformed or created by computer
technology.” He developed a university course, traveled around America
giving speeches and conducting workshops at conferences, and published
A Starter Kit for Teaching Computer Ethics.
By the early 1980s, the name “computer ethics” had caught on,
and other scholars began to develop this “new” field of applied
ethics.
Among those whom Maner inspired in 1978 was a workshop attendee, Terrell
Ward Bynum (the present author). In 1979, Bynum developed curriculum materials
and a university course, and in the early 1980s gave speeches and ran
workshops at a variety of conferences across America. In 1983, as Editor
of the journal Metaphilosophy, he launched
an essay competition to generate interest in computer ethics and to create
a special issue of the journal. In 1985, that special issue – entitled
Computers and Ethics – was published;
and it quickly became the widest-selling issue in the journal’s history.
The lead article – and winner of the essay competition – was
James Moor’s now-classic essay, “What Is Computer Ethics?.”
where he described computer ethics like this:
A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there
is a policy vacuum about how computer technology should be used. Computers
provide us with new capabilities and these in turn give us new choices
for action. Often, either no policies for conduct in these situations
exist or existing policies seem inadequate. A central task of computer
ethics is to determine what we should do in such cases, i.e., to formulate
policies to guide our actions. Of course, some ethical situations confront
us as individuals and some as a society. Computer ethics includes consideration
of both personal and social policies for the ethical use of computer
technology. (p. 266)
In Moor’s view computer ethics includes, (1)
identification of computer-generated policy vacuums, (2) clarification
of conceptual muddles, (3) formulation of policies for the use of computer
technology, and (4) ethical justification of such policies.
1985 was a watershed year for computer ethics, not only
because of the special issue of Metaphilosophy and Moor’s classic
article, but also because Deborah Johnson published the first major textbook
in the field (Computer Ethics), as well
as an edited collection of readings with John Snapper (Ethical
Issues in the Use of Computers). Johnson’s book Computer
Ethics rapidly established itself as the standard-setting textbook
in university courses, and it set the research agenda in computer ethics
for nearly a decade.
In her book, Johnson defined computer ethics as a field which examines
ways that computers “pose new versions of standard moral problems
and moral dilemmas, exacerbating the old problems, and forcing us to apply
ordinary moral norms in uncharted realms.” (p. 1) Unlike Maner (see
Maner 1996), with whom she had discussed computer ethics in the late 1970s,
Johnson did not think that computers created wholly new ethical problems,
but rather gave a “new twist” to already familiar issues such
as ownership, power, privacy and responsibility.
Since 1985, the field of computer ethics has grown exponentially.
New university courses, research centers, conferences, articles and textbooks
have appeared, and a wide diversity of additional scholars and topics
have become involved. For example, thinkers like Donald Gotterbarn, Keith
Miller, Simon Rogerson, and Dianne Martin – as well as organizations
like Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and ACM-SIGCAS – have spearheaded developments
relevant to computing and professional responsibility. Developments in
Europe and Australia have been especially noteworthy, including new research
centers in England, Poland, Holland, and Italy; the ETHICOMP series of
conferences led by Simon Rogerson and the present writer; the CEPE conferences
founded by Jeroen van den Hoven; and the Australian Institute of Computer
Ethics headed by John Weckert and Chris Simpson.
Given the explosive growth of computer ethics during the
past two decades, the field appears to have a very robust and significant
future. How can it be, then, that two important thinkers – Krystyna
Górniak-Kocikowska and Deborah Johnson – have recently argued
that computer ethics will disappear as a branch of applied ethics?
The Górniak Hypothesis
– In her 1995 ETHICOMP paper, Górniak predicted that computer ethics,
which is currently considered just a branch of applied ethics, will eventually
evolve into something much more. It will evolve into a system of global
ethics applicable in every culture on earth:
Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant
were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new
ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response
to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information
ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and
advocates believe. (p. 177)
The very nature of the Computer Revolution indicates that
the ethic of the future will have a global character. It will be global
in a spatial sense, since it will encompass the entire Globe. It will
also be global in the sense that it will address the totality of human
actions and relations. (p.179)
Computers do not know borders. Computer networks…
have a truly global character. Hence, when we are talking about computer
ethics, we are talking about the emerging global ethic. (p. 186)
…the rules of computer ethics, no matter how
well thought through, will be ineffective unless respected by the vast
majority of or maybe even all computer users. This means that in the
future, the rules of computer ethics should be respected by the majority
(or all) of the human inhabitants of the Earth.... In other words, computer
ethics will become universal, it will be a global ethic. (p.187)
According to the Górniak hypothesis, “local” ethical
theories like Europe’s Benthamite and Kantian systems and the ethical
systems of other cultures in Asia, Africa, the Pacific Islands, etc.,
will eventually be superseded by a global ethics evolving from today’s
computer ethics. “Computer” ethics, then, will become the “ordinary”
ethics of the information age.
The Johnson Hypothesis –
In her 1999 ETHICOMP paper, Deborah Johnson expressed a view which, upon
first sight, may seem to be the same as Górniak’s:
I offer you a picture of computer ethics in which computer ethics as such
disappears.... We will be able to say both that computer ethics has become
ordinary ethics and that ordinary ethics has become computer ethics. (Pp.
17 – 18)
But a closer look at the Johnson hypothesis reveals that
it is very different from Górniak’s. On Górniak’s view, the
computer revolution will eventually lead to a new ethical system, global
and cross-cultural in nature. The new “ethics for the information
age,” according to Górniak, will supplant parochial theories like
Bentham’s and Kant’s – theories based on relatively isolated
cultures in Europe, Asia, Africa, and other “local” regions
of the globe.
Johnson’s hypothesis, in reality, is essentially the
opposite of Górniak’s. It is another way of stating Johnson’s
often-defended view that computer ethics concerns “new species of
generic moral problems.” It assumes that computer ethics, rather
than replacing theories like Bentham’s and Kant’s, will continue
to presuppose them. Current ethical theories and principles, according
to Johnson, will remain the bedrock foundation of ethical thinking and
analysis, and the computer revolution will not
lead to a revolution in ethics.
At the dawn of the 21st century, then, computer ethics thinkers have offered
the world two very different views of the likely ethical relevance of
computer technology. The Wiener-Maner-Górniak point of
view sees computer technology as ethically revolutionary, requiring human
beings to reexamine the foundations of ethics and the very definition
of a human life. The more conservative Johnson perspective is that fundamental
ethical theories will remain unaffected – that computer ethics issues
are simply the same old ethics questions with a new twist – and consequently
computer ethics as a distinct branch of applied philosophy will ultimately
disappear.
Terrell Ward Bynum, ed. (1985), Computers
and Ethics, Basil Blackwell (published as the October 1985 issue
of Metaphilosophy).
Terrell Ward Bynum (1999), “The Foundation of Computer
Ethics,” a keynote address at the AICEC99 Conference, Melbourne,
Australia, July 1999.
Krystyna Górniak-Kocikowska (1996), “The Computer Revolution
and the Problem of Global Ethics” in Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon
Rogerson, eds., Global Information Ethics,
Opragen Publications, 1996, pp. 177 – 190, (the April 1996 issue
of Science and Engineering Ethics)
Deborah G. Johnson (1985), Computer Ethics,
Prentice-Hall. (Second Edition 1994).
Deborah G. Johnson (1999), “Computer Ethics in the
21st Century,” a keynote address at ETHICOMP99, Rome, Italy, October
1999.
Deborah G. Johnson and John W. Snapper, eds. (1985), Ethical
Issues in the Use of Computers, Wadsworth.
Walter Maner (1978), Starter Kit on Teaching
Computer Ethics (Self published in 1978. Republished in 1980 by
Helvetia Press in cooperation with the National Information and Resource
Center for Teaching Philosophy).
Maner, Walter (1996), “Unique Ethical Problems in Information Technology,”
in Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson, eds., Global
Information Ethics, Opragen Publications, 1996, pp. 137 –
52, (the April 1996 issue of Science and Engineering
Ethics).
James H. Moor (1985), “What Is Computer Ethics?” in Terrell
Ward Bynum, ed. (1985), Computers and Ethics,
Basil Blackwell, pp. 266 – 275.
Joseph Weizenbaum (1976), Computer Power and
Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, Freeman.
Norbert Wiener (1948), Cybernetics: or Control
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, Technology Press.
Norbert Wiener (1950/1954), The Human Use of
Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
(Second Edition Revised, Doubleday Anchor, 1954. This later edition is
better and more complete from a computer ethics point of view.)
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