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The relationship of problems in computer ethics to general
theories of ethics and values is made clear in Leslie Burkholder’s
description of the “Love Slave” advertisement and the exchanges
it stimulated. The analysis of this case leads quickly to the concept
of freedom of expression, the arguments of John Stuart Mill, etc. But
this raises a question about the status of “computer ethics “itself.
Is there really any such thing as computer ethics, an interdependent discipline?
Is computer ethics merely the application of well-worn ethical principles
to new cases, or does the analysis of the cases lead to new ethical principles?
Some believe that not much hangs on the answer to this question, but pursuing
it can show something about the complexities of inquiry within this field.
As is well known, one of the chief problems concerning the ethical use
of computer technology on campus is the pirating of software protected
by copyright. One question pursued at length during the panel discussion
on intellectual property and the ownership of software was whether software
piracy constitutes stealing. If it does, then these cases all can be straightforwardly
handled by means of existing ethical principles. However, some have argued
adamantly that software pirating does not fit the conceptual mold of stealing.
The point here is that a situation in which existing concepts have difficulty
applying to new situations signals the need not only for conceptual change,
but also for the reformulation of the relevant ethical principles themselves.
Existing principles which cover stealing become irrelevant and new principles
built around new concepts are required. To the extent that this occurs,
computer ethics is not merely the application of well-known ethical principles
and concepts but becomes a field whose uniqueness increases with the uniqueness
of computers and associated phenomena. Theoretical work in computer ethics
which aims at assessing and reformulating concepts and principles thus
takes on an added significance.
In his capstone conference address, John Ladd referred to the false analogies
of society that supported the wartime activities of Nazi Germany. This
reference is suggestive in respect to theoretical work in computer ethics.
Many of the discussions addressing tough questions in computer ethics
make use of analogies. These analogies characterize the computer and its
use as being similar or dissimilar to other entities or processes. For
example, during discussions of computer software piracy, comparisons were
made between copying someone’s software and swimming as an uninvited
guest in someone’s pool or borrowing an item without permission yet
returning it. The prime question here is how analogies should be evaluated
and criticized. Can we, for example, know that a societal analogy is faulty
when it is initially presented, or must we wait until that analogy has
been played out through history? How should analogies which emphasize
some features of computers and their use while de-emphasizing other features
be sorted out? Pursuing these questions leads to well-developed inquiries
in logic and epistemology and ties computer ethics to traditional fields
of philosophy.
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