Computer Ethics on Campus

Leslie Burkholder

• 1. Why a Code?
• 2. Code Content
• 3. A Code and More
• References

3. A Code and More

After much to-ing and fro-ing, the Computing Advisory Committee adopts a Code of Computer Ethics. It is, it turns out, very much like the Model Code devised by Chuck Augustine (see “Appendix – A Model Ethics Code for Computer Usage” below). So the head of Academic Computing is satisfied. But the committee thinks perhaps it should do more. The business ethics professor knows, for example, that businesses and professions certainly sometimes do more (Velasquez, 1990; Lee, 1986).

What businesses do, he explains, is run ethics training workshops. They do this in addition to having a code of conduct. The workshops can run for a morning or afternoon or several days. Sometimes they are run by people within the organization, often the managers of those taking the workshop. Sometimes they are run by outside instructors, specialists in business ethics. They can include a number of items: an overview of the company’s code of ethics, the discussion of several hypothetical cases that illustrate the code’s provisions, the discussion of some cases that involve moral dilemmas possibly not addressed by the code, an explanation of any assistance the company provides when employees are faced with a moral problem not clearly resolved by the code, and a discussion of things that might discourage ethical behavior in the company. Sometimes videotapes are used. Sometimes printed materials. But whatever their other differences, these workshops include the discussion of cases in which a decision needs to be made or commented on. And many of the professions do something similar; “ethics rounds” for doctors, for instance, are well known (Macklin, 1987).

Okay, so what are these case discussions like, asks the user consultant? I certainly have a case. What’s going to be said about it? (See “Figure 2. The Love Slave Advertisement”below.)

Well, says the business ethics professor in reply, we’d look at the code and see whether it forbids or allows the activity. It would be a discussion much like that among lawyers and justices determining what the Constitution forbids or permits. These discussions are intended to illustrate the code and help people understand what its rules mean. If you look at our new code, you can see that it would forbid the Love Slave posting. Notice the code says that public messages should respect the dignity of all users of the system. This one doesn’t; it’s offensive to women and Filipinos (Kerr, 1991). Some users might not appreciate that fact, thinking they were just being funny, and so not see how the code applied.

All right, that’s clear enough, says the skeptical scientist who earlier asked about evidence for the effectiveness of codes. But I want to know how you know these discussions make a difference.

That’s easy, too, says the business ethics professor. There’s plenty of evidence, he continues, that discussion of hypothetical cases, especially those that concern some sort of dilemma, improves people’s ability to reason about moral matters (Schlaefi, Rest, and Thoma, 1985). Some of Kohlberg’s work on moral development was devoted to gathering this kind of evidence (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975).

Hold on, the philosopher interrupts. There seem to be two kinds of discussions, he says. You’re mixing up yours with the kind of discussions Kohlberg investigates. There’s the training session. This is what you described. And probably they make some difference. Certainly you can expect people to benefit from help in understanding rules or practice in their application. That’s true for the construction of proofs in geometry and language learning (Anderson, 1991). Why should things be different with the rules in college ethics codes? So perhaps these are – for certain audiences, people new to the college and its ways – the most appropriate items. But besides the training sessions there are the real discussions, the searches for the truth. Your training session doesn’t ask, for example, whether our code should forbid such a posting. It takes the code for granted; its wisdom is not to be doubted. In fact, it’s these sorts of discussions that Kohlberg found effective at improving people’s reasoning in ethics.

But I don’t understand now, says the user consultant, what you’d do in these discussions, what you’d say, how you’d conduct them.

I can certainly think of some things to say about the Love Slave posting, replies the philosopher. People say, for example, that everyone has an inalienable right to freedom of speech or expression. Although some have in mind only a First Amendment constitutional right, others have in mind something else, a moral or human right, one we’d have whether or not our or anyone else’s constitution said anything about freedom of speech. It’s one we can’t give up or lose; it comes with being human or a person. That’s what they mean by its being inalienable. All the poster was doing was exercising his right. So he can’t have done anything wrong.

But the reasoning here isn’t so great, continues the philosopher. For having a right to freedom of expression doesn’t make every exercise of it right. It doesn’t give you blanket permission to lie, or to sing loudly, even political songs, in the dorms after midnight. Others would rather not appeal to rights but to the effects of the posting. Certainly, there is something wrong – at least inconsiderate – about the posting. It’s not that it is offensive, but how it gets to be so. It uses a prejudice against a disadvantaged group, one that hasn’t traditionally had the resources to even up the odds against this kind of prejudice (cf. Glass, 1978). Suppose, for example, the advertisement talked about a white male golfer instead?

Of course, continues the philosopher, some of this discussion may bring up the code. For instance, people may think that having a right to free speech means that the college can’t forbid any speech without violating that right. But other rights – for example, property or privacy rights – do not remove the possibility of restricting their exercise without doing wrong. Some may say that the college should allow speech a wide – perhaps even absolute – swath of freedom because of its beneficial consequences. After all, college is a place for research and education. Freedom to express and criticize ideas is needed for the investigation of their worth (Mill, ch. 2; Schauer, 1982, ch. 2) and for the growth of autonomous individuals (Mill, ch. 2; cf. Scanlon, 1972). But this, of course, doesn’t show that the Love Slave posting was okay. Finally, that it was wrong or inconsiderate doesn’t show that the code should forbid it. Perhaps, for learning purposes, it is best to leave such cases to public rebuke rather than instituting official sanctions.

And as for the method of discussion, there are several (Hannah and Matus, 1984; Hall and Davis, 1975, ch. 8). They include statements of the facts of the case and the offering and criticism of moral reasons favoring the evaluation of one choice over another. Both students and instructors participate in these offerings and criticisms. The result may not be a conclusion or it may be one that best sits in “reflective equilibrium” with all that’s said (Daniels, 1979). What’s important is not only the conclusion, if there is one, but the reasoning in support of it as well.

Carnegie Mellon University

Back to the top

Go to: References

Home > Teaching Resources > Computer Ethics Issues in Academic Computing > Computer Ethics on Campus

HOME | IN THE NEWS | RESEARCH RESOURCES
TEACHING RESOURCES | STUDENT RESOURCES
LINKS | THE GALLERY | STAFF

The Research Center on Computing & Society
at Southern Connecticut State University
501 Crescent Street • New Haven, CT 06515
Director: (203) 392-6790 • e-mail: webmaster@computerethics.org

© 2000 – 2007 – Research Center on Computing & Society