A Plea for Casual Copying

Helen Nissenbaum

• 1. Casual Copying
• 2. Johnson’s Two Challenges
• 3. Property Rights Not Challenged
• 4. Is Casual Copying Immoral?
• 4.1 The Civil Disobedience Question Finessed
• 4.2 Copying and Murder: Unauthorized Copying is Not a Moral Category
• 4.3 Morally Relevant Contextual Factors
• 5. Two Objections and Rejoinders
• 5.1 In a Free Market Let the Market Decide Morality
• 5.1.1 Rejoinder: In Our Markets Individual Rights Are Protected
• 5.2 Stealing is Wrong; Even if Done For the Sake of Altruism
• 5.2.1 Rejoinder: Casual Copying is Not Stealing
• 5.2.1 The Goal of Intellectual Property
• 5.2.3 The Slippery Slope
• Conclusion

1. Casual Copying

Let me introduce the notion of casual copying and define it as follows:

An individual engages in casual copying when, having purchased a commercial software application (program), he or she duplicates the program in a private setting giving a copy to a friend or family-member.

2. Johnson’s Two Challenges:

In Johnson’s discussion about personal copying, she questions whether casual copying is moral, arguing that it is not moral. I hold, and have also argued this elsewhere, that it is. Johnson opposes my position issuing two challenges:

1. It is unreasonable to target software property laws when private ownership of other things, such as natural resources or corporate conglomerates, seem much more menacing; and
2. Since the system of laws governing software ownership is “relatively just,” unauthorized copying is immoral because it violates the legal rights of property owners even if it is done in the name of altruism.

3. Property Rights Not Challenged

In her first challenge, Johnson has misinterpreted the intent of my argument about software property laws. Far from rejecting the grounds for private ownership of computer software, or for that matter any other property, I take as a working assumption that individuals do have the right to privately own property. However, the set of rights frequently defended for software owners is even more extensive than the equivalent rights accorded to owners of other forms of property. Far from being the poor relative, when it comes to protection of software under property law, software owners are particularly well-endowed. Furthermore, I charge that there are at least some cases – such as the case of a well-meaning person duplicating a program for a friend- for which this extra-protection is not morally defensible because while it responds to the interests of software owners, it fails to credit the competing demands of other individuals. In other words, I have not in general disputed private ownership of software, but rather, have argued that even if we assume there to be good grounds for defending private ownership in general, and private ownership of software in particular, casual copying is not immoral.

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